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Interest, Principle, and Beyond: 
American Understandings of Conflict 
Don Herzog 
To understand U.S. foreign policy, we need to understand the concepts and 
categories that Americans bring to bear. After all, we see the world through 
our concepts and categories. They identify what's possible, what's desirable, 
indeed what's visible in the first place. There is simply no possibility of 
junking all our concepts, stepping outside them, and gaining an unmediated 
grasp of the world. Here, I offer a sketch of American understandings of 
conflict. Understandings, not understanding: even in the realm of foreign 
policy, Americans have long brought intriguingly different categories to bear, 
categories whose richness isn't captured by some standard academic models. 
I want to begin by suggesting that it's mistaken to assume that each 
culture must have some unified account of "conflict." U.S. culture clearly 
doesn't. It's not just that we have a number of competing accounts of conflict, 
though we do. Nor is it just a matter of cultural pluralism, of WASPs and 
Cuban-Americans and so on seeing the world differently, though they do. 
"Conflict" itself is an abstract category, that is supposed to bring together and 
illuminate different activities in very different social settings. I conjecture that 
the term itself comes more easily to social scientists (and those who have been 
through certain kinds of psychotherapy) than it does to the ordinary speaker. 
Those tempted to think that "conflict" is the name of some deep essence that 
all kinds of conflict have in common, that we use the category to strip away 
merely contingent and accidental details and illuminate what's central, are 
tempted in precisely the wrong direction, one inviting a Wittgensteinian re-
joinder: concepts need have no deep core or essence at all, no property or 
properties found in each and every instantiation of the concept; they tie things 
together by loose relations of family resemblance, no more. 
Think about the following familiar scripts, which I present in a deliber-
Hearty thanks to Charles Stein, who tolerated endlessly disjoint conversations and contrib-
uted some of the ideas and formulations of this chapter. 
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ately stylized way. It's an open question whether they actually capture what 
goes on in the world. Nonetheless, they provide some of our most familiar 
accounts of various sorts of conflict. 
The playgroundjistfight. The schoolyard bully swaggers up to a bespec-
tacled nerd and demands his lunch money. To the bully's astonishment, the 
nerd doesn't deliver. Anxious but defiant, he says, "no way." The bully 
pushes him around a bit; the nerd pushes back. Fists are swinging blindly, and 
the nerd's glasses get crunched, an untimely demise. Suddenly the nerd's 
friends appear and tell the bully to get lost. After some uncertain blustering, 
he does. 
The marital spat. Jim gets home late from work, and to his disgust the 
meat loaf is burnt. He glares at Kathy. In a moment he'll regret later, he 
impulsively lobs a characteristically barbed sarcasm: "You've made this 3000 
times before, so you really should have it down by now." Fed up with what 
she's recently learned to think of as sexist crap, Kathy responds with some 
contempt, "Why don't you go out and grab some beer?" Jim decides to do just 
that. Before he's out the door, though, the two have exchanged increasingly 
cutting remarks on in-laws, the household budget, and their sex life. 
Market competition. Wizzabee's Widgets, long thought to have a lock on 
northeastern sales outlets, have been slipping in quality, and some of the 
dealers are disgruntled. The chairman of the board of Spacely Sprockets pores 
over a report by an ambitious junior executive suggesting that Spacely enter 
this new market. "Risky," he murmurs, shaking his head, "risky." Then he 
looks at the depressingly flat graph of company growth in the last three 
quarters and decides to enter the widget business. Wizzabee's is caught asleep 
at the switch, and within a year most dealers are happily buying Spacely 
Widgets, still priced a bit under cost to secure the new market. 
Scholarly dispute. At the national meetings of the Society of Medieval 
French Historians, two professors continue their long-standing debate on 
criminal behavior in rural communities. One, a marxisante historian, wants to 
cast such behavior as a desperate response to the ongoing exploitation of the 
peasants by their bastard feudal lords. Another, more influenced by Durkheim 
than Marx, wants to think of the criminals as deviants testing and demonstrating 
the boundaries of communal identity. The evidence is tantalizingly sketchy, 
the argument on each side increasingly intricate, the audience alternately 
amused and stupefied. 
Racial tension. "The old neighborhood just isn't what it used to be," 
sighs Glen, trying to explain to his daughter why they're selling their home. 
Away at college, she explodes with indignation. "You just mean that finally 
blacks are buying some homes. Dad, I never thought I'd hear you talking this 
way." Glen dodges. "Well, not quite that. But property values are falling. And 
there's something different about the tone of the neighborhood that your 
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mother and I just don't like." The local newspaper runs a story on white flight; 
rumors of a cross-burning abound. The neighborhood may be integrated, but 
people's social networks are completely segregated. 
Sibling rivalry. Timmy, four years old, greets the new baby with a 
measured equanimity that leaves his parents surprised but deeply pleased. 
Once he'd found out what Mom's big tummy meant, he'd been increasingly 
sullen, and sometimes had lashed out with fearsome anger, even threatening 
to flush his new brother down the toilet. Still, they're home from the hospital, 
with the baby, and, after a lot of anguished thought and consultation, no gift 
for Timmy, lest he think they're bribing him. And Timmy seems quite happy. 
He even gives the baby a perfunctory peck on the cheek. Now it's time for 
him to go to daycare, and he wheels around. "Mom?" "Yes, dear?" "Just one 
more thing. When I come back today, I don't expect to see this baby here any 
more." 
I could, of course, go on. Since the United States is a highly differenti-
ated society, with crisply demarcated roles and institutions built on different 
internal logics, I could, in fact, go on for some time. Don't these familiar 
facts militate against thinking that "conflict" names some deep common es-
sence worth capturing? If there is something in common, isn't it going to be 
completely banal and uninteresting? (Compare this all-too-familiar riddle 
from social science: "What do courts have in common?" "Courts are instru-
ments of dispute resolution." This would be worth telling a six-year-old, or a 
visiting Martian anthropologist, but it doesn't tell us anything we didn't 
already kn-ow.) There may in fact be nothing that all these sorts of conflict 
have in common. Again, what unites various sorts of conflict may be nothing 
more than a loose family resemblance. 
There's an important point here about the logic of comparative studies in 
political science. Often people respond to case studies or stories about some 
other country by demanding, "What generalization emerges from this? What 
does this have in common with other cases, other times, other places?" Typ-
ically, though, what's interesting about comparative studies is what's differ-
ent, not what's the same. Anthropologists don't go to Bali or study potlatch to 
show that lo! they're just like us. The differences they discover aren't just 
inherently interesting, a way of providing the pleasures of tourism in an 
armchair. Rather they throw what's distinctive about our own way of doing 
things, what we had taken for granted, into high relief. We learn not just about 
them, but also about us. Similarly here: I take it we're interested in sorting out 
the American and Japanese and Russian and Chinese views of conflict not 
because we think that they must ultimately be the same, but because we want 
to know more about the differences, and how the differences make a differ-
ence. But then one can repeat the same point within each country. Again, 
there may be some distinctively national style informing or even governing 
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conflict in what seemed like different social settings: whether there is such a 
style is just another empirical question. Given what I know, my best bet is that 
we won't gain anything interesting by trying to isolate The American View of 
conflict. Instead I want to focus specifically on American views of war. 
One other prefatory point (the penalty for inviting a political theorist to 
contribute to such a project), on what we tend too grandly to call methodol-
ogy. Investigating Americans' view of conflict is not best viewed as a question 
about their behavior, even their "verbal behavior." It's more an interpretive 
enterprise, trying to reconstruct the concepts and criteria they use to sort out 
the world, to understand what does and should go on. If, to invoke Wittgen-
stein yet again, we are pursuing a language-game or a set of language-games, 
then we want to try to figure out the rules and principles of the game. 
Political scientists are wont to think of concepts and especially ideology 
as constraints. But that is, by and large, a mistake. (It's not a mistake unique 
to political scientists. Durkheim makes a similar mistake about social facts in 
The Rules of Sociological Method; Bentham casts law simply as a matter of 
prohibiting certain courses of action; and so on.) True, concepts rule out some 
courses of action. Any vocabulary will downplay certain possibilities, will 
make them elusive or invisible or presumptively unacceptable. More impor-
tant, though, concepts, even ideological concepts, open up new possibilities 
we wouldn't notice without them. Think of a social actor with no concepts at 
all. Such a curious fellow wouldn't be the most flexible actor of us all, the one 
uniquely well positioned to grasp far-flung possibilities in nuanced detail. 
Like someone trying to study the natural world without any concepts, he'd be 
mute, blind, paralyzed. 
Concepts of war can, I suppose, serve as causes of war. Some views of 
war make it inevitable in any actual or even imaginable circumstances; others 
serve as self-fulfilling prophecies. (Consider: war is the rightful response to 
not always getting our way. Or, war is our destiny, our divine assignment, the 
only road to historical progress. Or, war is an ordinary and uninteresting 
social practice, in need of no special justification or excuse. Or, in a different 
way, war is what you must do whenever circumstances .xyz arise, and, unde-
niably, we now find ourselves in such circumstances.) Ordinarily, though, the 
concepts we use to understand and appraise war neither preclude nor necessi-
tate any war. A road map doesn't tell you what your destination must be. The 
rules of grammar don't tell you what you ought to say. Engineering doesn't 
tell you whether or where to build a bridge. Similarly, views of war don't 
make you fight particular wars. They set up a complicated and partly indeter-
minate game, allowing the players to make different interpretive moves in 
coming to terms with political events. Launching or continuing or withdraw-
ing from war turns out, sometimes surprisingly, to be at the end of some path 
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in the game we launched on. So it doesn't all hang on the concepts. Much of it 
hangs on the way lots of little contingencies happen to come together in the 
world. 
It's not just a question of what war in fact is (not that that's an easy 
question itself). We want also to know how war arises. Most important, we 
want to know what counts as a justification of war, or what Americans take to 
count as a justification. (Those who believe that social science depends on a 
fact/value distinction have no reason to avoid this agenda, for it's just a matter 
of fact that some consideration is taken in some community to count as a 
justification, and scholars can report the fact without endorsing or condemn-
ing it.) Studying the criteria that can be brought to bear in justifying war 
ought to be a central concern of the most bombs-and-rockets-oriented scholars 
among us. For those bombs don't go off, those rockets don't get fired, unless 
someone can tell a convincing story about why they ought to be. "Because I 
felt like it" isn't a good reason; indeed it isn't any kind of reason at all. Not, 
anyway, in America. 
There's an obvious political reason for treating the justification of war as 
central in the United States. Since this is a democracy, framing a justification 
that (most of) the public will accept is a precondition of pursuing any military 
expedition effectively. (One way to write the story of Vietnam is to cast it as a 
war in search of a justification-not a fanciful suggestion in light of those 
internal memos later published in the Pentagon Papers.) The point remains 
central even if one is generally of the bent we weirdly call realist, even, that 
is, if one is inclined to think of state policymakers as unswervingly devoted to 
the pursuit of the national interest. Even if that's the only story they care 
about, it's not, in fact, a story that can always be told in public. (Nor, in fact, 
are our policymakers such unswerving realists. To give just one example, 
Richard Nixon frequently invoked the concept of honor in discussing Viet-
nam. It's implausible that he had no regard for honor, but was oppor-
tunistically trying to manipulate public opinion. The best bet is that Nixon 
himself was captivated by the concept.) So one could profitably reconstruct 
the tacit rules governing the permissibility of invoking interest. 
Sometimes invoking national interest does work amazingly well. Con-
sider for instance the U.S. decision to send ships into the Persian Gulf, 
ostensibly to protect Kuwait's oil tankers. Presenting that decision to the 
American public, President Reagan invoked the national interest-but he 
never explained quite what interest was at stake, or how the presence of U.S. 
ships would protect it. Still, despite the carping of some critics, the appeal 
seemed largely successful. There's an ironic twist here: Americans sound and 
behave most like realists when they're asleep at the switch, when they're 
paying no attention whatever to any actual calculation of costs and benefits. 
Sometimes an appeal to the national interest appears, but isn't the central 
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point. In 1893, President Harrison urged that a decision to annex Hawaii "will 
be highly promotive of the best interests of the Hawaiian people, and is the 
only one that will adequately secure the interests of the United States. These 
interests are not wholly selfish." 1 More recently, we could say that we liber-
ated the people of Grenada from an oppressive regime; we could lamely add 
that we protected American medical students. But we had to appeal to the 
interests of the people of Grenada, not our own. Similarly we couldn't pub-
licly say what many believed must be true, that U.S. policy in Nicaragua was 
motivated by our own interests. We had to say that the Sandinistas had broken 
the revolutionary promises that they had made to their own people (just as 
Adlai Stevenson told the U.N. after the Bay of Pigs that "The Castro regime 
has betrayed the Cuban revolution"2); though again we could lamely add that 
they were only hundreds of miles from Texas, one of the more whimsical uses 
of worries about dominos. More recently yet, President Bush found himself 
fumbling for other and putatively better reasons after suggesting that we saved 
Kuwait because the price of oil and American jobs were on the line. Here, 
perhaps, we centrally appeal to the interests of others, and tack on some story 
about national interest to explain why we're bothering to get involved. 
Sometimes, though, an appeal to the national interest is a nonstarter. 
Think about all the policy options that never get seriously considered. At the 
height of OPEC's power, William F. Buckley, Jr., suggested that we conquer 
Libya, thus gaining some oil and getting rid ofQaddafi. That might have been 
in our interests. So might grabbing Quebec and the Yucatan as vacation spots, 
or for that matter turning sharply against Israel and South Africa, so escaping 
international opprobrium and saving lots of money besides. One can always 
generate a story about why doing any of those things wouldn't really be in our 
interests, by emphasizing indirect consequences and the like. But those stories 
don't show that indeed U.S. policy is diligently devoted to the national inter-
est. Instead they remind us how marvelously pliable talk of interest is, how 
soft this allegedly hardheaded guide to the world is. 
Realists have sometimes acknowledged, but sometimes forgotten, that 
it's often very hard to figure out what our interests are and how to attain them, 
that lurking behind the apparently hardheaded category of "interest" are 
knotty disagreements about empirical and moral matters. The permanent 
availability of disputes about our interests means that realism could never 
furnish the brisk sort of foreign policy its patrons want it to. Walter Lipp-
mann, for instance, criticized Woodrow Wilson for giving "legalistic and 
I. James D. Richardson, comp., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presi-
dents (New York: Bureau of National Literatures, 1917), 9: 348ff. 
2. Henry Steele Commager, ed., Documents of American History, 8th ed. (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), 2: 681. 
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moralistic and idealistic reasons" instead of appealing to "durable and com-
pelling reasons," namely "the substantial and vital reason that the security of 
the United States demanded that no aggressively expanding imperial power, 
like Germany, should be allowed to gain the mastery of the Atlantic Ocean."3 
And Henry Kissinger has suggested that American foreign policy lacks "stay-
ing power" because of our "denial that our interests are involved."4 But even 
if the United States became a far more thoroughgoing realist actor than it is 
and has been, its foreign policy could still swerve and stagger, thanks again to 
unending disputes about what our interests are and how to attain them. 
Again, though, even if American policymakers were hard-boiled realists, 
even if they were to wake up and go to sleep citing chapter and verse from 
Morgenthau, the rest of us aren't like that. So even realist policymakers hell-
bent on pursuing the national interest would have to figure out how to justify 
their military adventures to ordinary citizens, to the rest of us. In fact, I 
suspect, our policymakers are no more single-minded realists than the rest of 
us are. I don't doubt that their subculture is different, that people buried in the 
bowels of the State Department employ some peculiar concepts and catego-
ries. And it may be that their subculture is closer to realism than American 
culture at large is. Still, no matter what their own beliefs, they have to find 
some way of talking not just to Congress but ultimately to the rest of us. It will 
be useful, then, to spend some time considering formal political documents: 
Presidential addresses, Congressional debates, declarations of war, and the 
like. Not that such documents provide transparent access into the deepest 
mental states of their authors: far from it. For these purposes, what matters 
isn't what the policymakers really think, but what they think the rest of us 
think. 
To underline how systematically American views of war depart from 
realism, I want briefly to recall Robert W. Tucker's somewhat hysterical 
contribution to the debate on North-South relations, The Inequality of Na-
tions. Tucker's disdain for the thought that poor countries in the global econ-
omy have any claims of justice to press against rich countries hangs partly on 
a crude variant of moral skepticism common among social scientists. But 
that's not what makes his book interesting. Tucker senses that the kinds of 
arguments often advanced on these subjects aren't readily captured by the 
structures brought to bear by realists, game theorists, and the like. I mean, 
broadly speaking, what we call rational-choice analysis. If we understand 
3. Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1950), 37. 
4. Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 3d ed. (New York: Norton, 1977), 
91-92. 
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what's distinctive about that approach, we'll be able to grasp what's different 
about American views on war. Perhaps I should emphasize that it would beg 
the question, it would lean too heavily on mere words, to suppose that Ameri-
can departures from "rational-choice analysis" show that Americans are irra-
tional or unreasonable. 
In a rational-choice view, war is indeed the continuation of politics by 
other means, where politics in tum is the pursuit of advantage by actors with 
well-defined goals. They may find themselves in coordination dilemmas, in 
prisoners' dilemmas, in zero-sum games, in games with no determinate solu-
tion: regardless, they are in the business of weighing costs and benefits. 
Ordinarily one assumes those costs and benefits are commensurable and (ide-
alizing for the sake of the mathematics) infinitely divisible, that one can think 
of giving up or putting in a bit more or less. That view, familiar in the 
academy, doesn't resonate in American culture. In fact, a casual survey sug-
gests that Americans pride themselves on reviling any such account of war. 
A first point: many of the famous battle cries of Americans stake out all-
or-nothing positions that don't permit calculations of marginal payoffs or 
trade-otis or anything of the sort. 54' 40" or fight, unconditional surrender, 
give me liberty or give me death: such categories aren't shrewd second-order 
bargaining strategies, an attempt to precommit to an unbudgeable position to 
force the opponent to back down. They might end up working that way 
(though given a conventional story about the failures of the Versailles Treaty 
and the rise of Hitler, that wouldn't make them a triumph of rationality). But 
the actors don't understand them that way. They take themselves simply to be 
insisting on the right outcome. 
A second point: appeals to morality have long played an important role in 
American foreign policy. President Carter wasn't eccentric in making human 
rights a central justificatory resource in foreign policy. The Four Freedoms, 
making the world safe for democracy, trying to compel the Soviet Union to let 
Jews emigrate: Americans have embraced such familiar causes not because 
they have a roundabout story about why they're in our interests, but because 
they're morally attractive or even required. Tucker's worry about moralism in 
foreign policy isn'tjust a skeptical worry that there's nothing really there, that 
it's all arrant nonsense. It's a worry that moral principles don't lend them-
selves to quasi-economic calculation. One doesn't compromise, we often 
think, when an issue of principle is at stake. Compromise would be evidence 
not of rationality, not of realism, but of reprehensible lack of integrity. Only 
scoundrels pursue interests when principles are at stake. That is why John 
Kennedy sounded such deliberately anti-economic tones in his frequently 
quoted dictum that the United States would "pay any price, bear any burden, 
meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival 
and the success of liberty." 
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It's too quick, though, to think that self-interest and principle are simple 
opposites, that those not committed to some version of realism about foreign 
policy are Wilsonian idealists. The juxtaposition between self-interest and 
principle, realism and moralism, isn't only stale; more important, it doesn't 
come close to exhausting the alternatives. Notice here Secretary of State 
Stimson's 1931 address to the Council on Foreign Relations. Wilson, urged 
Stimson, had departed from long-standing U.S. policy in deciding not to 
recognize Mexico because it wasn't a "just government based upon law," 
wasn't based on "the consent of the governed." Americans had never previ-
ously paid-and, if Stimson had his way, would never again, pay-attention 
to "the de jure element of legitimacy"; instead, they would regard only a 
new government's "de facto ... control of the administrative machinery of 
the state" and the like. Stimson sympathetically echoed Jefferson's view 
"that every nation has a right to govern itself internally under what form 
it pleases."5 But that too, of course, is a principle. Stimson no more than 
Wilson wanted to decide whether to recognize a new government by asking if 
doing so would serve U.S. interests. He was pursuing neither the national 
interest nor Wilsonian moralism. And he was restating long-standing U.S. 
policy. That policy at least sometimes really did have clout. President Cleve-
land reversed Harrison's stand on Hawaii, urging in part that the toppling of 
Hawaii's government had been accomplished "by a process every step of 
which . . . is directly traceable to and dependent for its success upon the 
agency of the United States acting through its diplomatic and naval represen-
tatives."6 That meant there was no autonomous support of the Hawaiian 
people, and so Cleveland decided not to annex Hawaii. 
It's not just that there are different kinds of principle. The juxtaposition 
between interest and principle isn't only stale; more important, it doesn't 
come close to exhausting the alternatives. My third point concerns a curious 
mixture of views surrounding the categories of purity, cleanliness, filth, and 
redemption, views that have nothing to do with interest or principle. Consider 
a category familiar to U.S. historians, that of American exceptionalism. From 
the founding, there was supposed to be something different about America, 
something making this nation pure and shining and even divinely favored as 
against those corrupt Europeans. Tom Paine deliberately manipulated Ameri-
cans' religiosity by arguing in Common Sense that America, the new world, 
was also America the promised land, a fresh beginning. Like Israel after 
Egypt, like life after the flood, America was God's starting from scratch. 
American society would be purged or cleansed of the characteristic sins of the 
ancien regime, among them the style of diplomacy that realists would en-
5. Commager, Documents, 2: 225-26. 
6. Richardson, Compilation, 9: 46lff. 
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shrine as the very model of judicious behavior. The same sentiments animate 
Washington's famous Proclamation of Neutrality, holding out to Americans 
the promise of using the once vast Atlantic Ocean to distance themselves from 
the filthy maneuvering for interest that ensnared Europeans in endless war: 
"Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different 
course." Celebrating the accomplishments of the Pan-American group in 
1939, FOR would contrast the Americas' "serenity and calm" with "the tragic 
involvements which are today making the Old World a new cockpit of old 
struggles. "7 
Here peace is what makes America pure. (There are other dimensions to 
purity, like the racial purity that has tantalized many Americans since the 
founding, when Jefferson mused about sending the slaves back to Africa, and 
Benjamin Rush found scientific evidence that blacks were just whites suffer-
ing a curious kind of leprosy. This sort of purity itself has implications for 
foreign policy-recall, for instance, disputes about Asian immigration during 
this century, or how the thought of admitting eight million Mexicans to the 
Union led John Calhoun to temper his imperialism by noting, "Ours, sir, is the 
government of a white race"-but I can't pursue it here.) Isolationists and 
Christian pacifists follow this tradition. Critics of U.S. policy have sometimes 
found it useful to invoke the same tradition as part of their critique. So, I take 
it, arises the subversively critical force of Walter LaFeber's referring to the 
history of American policy in terms of empire and second empire, political 
and economic domination: those categories were supposed to apply only to 
those bellicose European dynasties, not America, so it should come as an 
alarming revelation that American policy can be cast just the same way. 
If peace is purity, war is filth. Like everyone else, I suppose, Americans 
have always romanticized war: our boys abroad make us proud; they are 
involved in the great adventure hailed by Teddy Roosevelt, fighting one splen-
did little war or another. But some Americans have always tried to puncture 
the romantic illusions, to hammer home the familiar lesson that war is hell. So 
the dubious hero of The Red Badge of Courage learns the lesson that Thomas 
Hobbes long ago stated drily: "When Armies fight, there is on one side, or 
both, a running away. "8 William James, appalled by Roosevelt's rhetoric, 
tried to make room for what he called the moral equivalent of war, other 
settings in which men could strive heroically. Literature is one thing, though; 
television is another. There is nothing for stripping war of its romanticism like 
beaming it live into millions of American households on the evening news, as 
happened during the Vietnam War. (The day after announcing he wouldn't run 
for re-election, Lyndon Johnson mused, "As I sat in my office last evening, 
7. Richardson, Compilation, I; 214; Commager, Documents, 2; 414. 
8. Leviathan, chap. 21. 
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waiting to speak, I thought of the many times each week when television 
brings the war into the American home. No one can say exactly what effect 
those vivid scenes have on American opinion." No one could say exactly, but 
Johnson had some inklings. He went on to wonder what would have happened 
after the Battle of the Bulge or during defeats in Korea had Americans been 
able to watch television coverage.9) After years of that exercise, Frank Capra 
films could never be viewed quite the same way. One source of the appeal of 
the lightning surgical strike, what we might call the Grenada effect, must lie 
here: we're victors before we have to witness the carnage as we eat dinner. 
That peace is pure, war filthy, isn't distinctively American: it's a banal 
truism, a syrupy slogan one might hear in Sunday school. But there's also an 
intriguing inversion. War itself can be purifying, cleansing, restorative: an 
ocean of blood can wash away the sins of a failed America. The best-known 
case is the reaction of many Northern intellectuals to the civil war. Charles 
Eliot Norton, for one, had no patience with any "feeble sentimentalities" 
about overestimating the value of human life: "I can hardly help wishing that 
the war might go on and on till it has brought suffering and sorrow enough to 
quicken our consciences and cleanse our hearts." Emerson, for another, had 
the characteristically questionable taste to console the bereaved parents of a 
colonel "that one whole generation might well consent to perish, if by their 
fall, political liberty & clean & just life could be made sure to the generations 
that follow." IO 
Nearby is another twist on the ideas of cleanliness and purity: war is the 
struggle between light and darkness, good and evil. One doesn't have a 
conflict of interest with Nazi Germany: that's the sort of thought that leads to 
Chamberlain's appeasement, which here.looms not just as bad calculation but 
as a deal with the devil. Instead the Third Reich is evil incarnate, what we 
must be justified in sweeping off the face of the earth. (The deep appeal of this 
moral view, instructively, is almost completely absent from Bruce Russett's 
account of why America shouldn't have entered World War II.) Or think of 
Kennan's famous Mr. X article: it argues that the Soviet regime has an inher-
ently expansionist dynamic, so that if it is successfully contained it will 
inevitably collapse; but the article can be taken, and has been taken, as urging 
something very like a quarantine. Or recall the celebration as well as the 
brouhaha surrounding Reagan's reference to the Soviet Union as the evil 
empire, before he warmed up so dramatically to Gorbachev. Many Americans 
were happy to have a leader finally willing to say what was simply true, 
9. James MacGregor Bums, ed., To Heal and to Build: the Programs of Lyndon B. johnson 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 468. 
10. George M. Fredrickson, The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of 
the Union (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 74, 80, 81. 
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instead of uttering mealymouthed pieties in the name of diplomacy. The 
bleakly comic possibilities in thinking of war as sanitation didn't escape the 
erratic geniuses of Monty Python, who offered a history of the Vietnam War 
as a cartoon commercial for a laundry detergent named Uncle Sam's-1 think 
these are the details-which promises to get the red out, as the viewer 
watches a red, white, and blue gauntlet pouring detergent over a teeming map 
of Southeast Asia. 
A fourth point: there's an entirely different American approach, a chill-
ingly confident one, to thinking about conflict. It qualifies, I suppose, as a 
political version of bad faith. War isn't anything like a conflict of interest 
because it isn't in any interesting way elective or voluntary and because they, 
whoever they are at the moment, just have no standing. War here is necessary, 
inevitable, divinely appointed. Manifest destiny wasn't in any strong sense a 
justification of conflict. It's better viewed as a denial that there was any 
conflict that needed justifying, any land grabbing or Indian killing that might 
be morally objectionable in the first place. (Indian killing-I use the contem-
porary name-is another occasion for celebrating the cleansing power of 
murder. Robert Bird's best-selling novel of the 1830s, Nick of the Woods, can 
be read as a celebration or a critique. It features a Quaker, Nathan Slaughter, 
who, it turns out, secretly and gruesomely kills Indians because they once 
killed the members of his own family. His public protestations of pacifism 
ring hollow once we learn that he is Nick of the Woods; and-this may be 
literary clumsiness more than practiced ambiguity-it's not clear whether the 
reader is supposed to identify with Quaker Nathan or genocidal Nick.) Cham-
pions of manifest destiny not only appealed to Scripture, what even one so 
sagacious as John Quincy Adams once had read into the Congressional Record 
to explain what right Americans had to push the Indians ever westward. They 
also likened the expansion of America to the laws of gravity, arguing that 
America must surge west (and north and south, for that matter; a minor 
instance I've always found amusing is Walt Whitman's Brooklyn editorials 
urging that the United States seize the Yucatan) just as an apple must fall from 
a tree. Or again, while inviting Congress to declare war against Britain in 
1812, Madison said the United States "shall commit a just cause into the 
hands of the Almighty Disposer of Events, avoiding all connections which 
might entangle it in the contest or views of other powers." War here is nothing 
but a judicial appeal. 
I want to quote one example of the rhetoric of manifest destiny at length. 
This is from William Gilpin's 1873 book, The Mission of the North American 
People: 
The calm, wise man sets himself to study aright and understand clearly 
the deep designs of Providence-to scan the great volume of nature-to 
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fathom, if possible, the will of the Creator, and to receive with respect 
what may be revealed to him. 
Two centuries have rolled over our race upon this continent. From 
nothing we have become 20,000,000. From nothing we are grown to be 
in agriculture, in commerce, in civilization, and in natural strength, the 
first among nations existing or in history. So much is our destiny-so far, 
up to this time-transacted, accomplished, certain, and not to be dis-
puted. From this threshold we read the future. 
The untransacted destiny of the American people is to subdue the 
continent-to rush over this vast field to the Pacific Ocean-to animate 
the many hundred millions of its people, and to cheer them upward-to 
set the principle of self-government at work-to agitate these herculean 
masses-to establish a new order in human affairs-to set free the 
enslaved-to regenerate superannuated nations-to change darkness 
into light-to stir up the sleep of a hundred centuries-to teach old 
nations a new civilization-to confirm the destiny of the human race-to 
carry the career of mankind to its culminating point-to cause stag-
nant people to be re-born-to perfect science-to emblazon history with 
the conquest of peace-to shed a new and resplendent glory upon 
mankind-to unite the world in one social family-to dissolve the spell 
of tyranny and exalt charity-to absolve the curse that weighs down 
humanity, and to shed blessings round the world! 
Divine task! immortal mission! Let us tread fast and joyfully the open 
trail before us! Let every American heart open wide for patriotism to 
glow undimmed, and confide with religious faith in the sublime and 
prodigious destiny of his well-loved country. ·· 
Gilpin's rhetoric is incoherent in much the same way vulgar Marxism often is. 
He invites us to cooperate with our destiny, to choose to do what we must 
inevitably do. Its incoherence, though, doesn't mean it's politically unattrac-
tive. Nor, I think, should we be cavalier in dismissing such rhetoric as mere 
fluff, or for that matter as something we've outgrown. 
Similarly, the Monroe Doctrine has sometimes been treated not as a 
contingent policy we've staked out, a choice we've made, but as a natural 
fact, not subject to our control or revaluation. Their missiles in Cuba aren't 
the least bit like our missiles in Turkey, because theirs just don't belong here. 
Communist influence in South America flouts long-standing U.S. policy, 
which drifts readily into U.S. tradition, which drifts readily into, flatly, the 
way things are. It's unnatural; when we move against it, we are simply 
restoring things to their pre-appointed harmony, the normal or natural state. I 
doubt American policymakers are taken in by this enough to be as virtuously 
astonished as they often sound in condemning foreign interference in Latin 
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America, in refusing to see any parallels with American policy; I don't doubt 
that they find it politically useful to pretend they're astonished. That particular 
message is for domestic consumption. 
A closely connected point: if conflict is hard to justify, just deny there's 
any conflict at all. James Polk was a master of this move. In a single message 
to Congress, he described the impending annexation of Texas as a "union ... 
consummated by ... voluntary consent," adding, 
This accession to our territory has been a bloodless achievement. No arm 
of force has been raised to produce the result. The sword has had no part 
in the victory. We have not sought to extend our territorial possessions by 
conquest, or our republican institutions over a reluctant people. It was 
the deliberate homage of each people to the great principle of our federa-
tive union. 
Talk of victory, though, was a revealing slip. Though war had not yet broken 
out, Mexico's ambassador to the United States had already demanded his 
passport and returned home, after informing Polk that Mexico viewed these 
moves as a wholly aggressive violation of its sovereignty. That's why Polk 
moved blithely on, as though it was a separate subject, to say, "I regret to 
inform you that our relations with Mexico since your last session have not 
been of the amicable character which it is our desire to cultivate with all 
foreign nations." 
At the same time, what looked very like conflict was brewing with 
Britain over the Oregon territory. Calm as ever, in the very same message, 
Polk reported that Britain had made "extraordinary and wholly inadmissible 
demands," that "our title to the whole Oregon Territory [is] asserted, and, as is 
believed, maintained by irrefragable facts and arguments." Note here the 
salutary political advantages of the passive voice, which enables Polk to avoid 
posing the embarrassing question, who believes it? (At the very least, one 
suspects, not the British.) Polk again disguised a contestable political judg-
ment as an unquestionable fact when he added, "The civilized world will see 
in these proceedings a spirit of liberal concession on the part of the United 
States, and this Government will be relieved from all responsibility which 
may follow the failure to settle the controversy." To disagree with the U.S. 
position here is presumptively to declare that one isn't civilized: and then, of 
course, one's judgment doesn't count anyway. 
Something finally might be said about Americans' views of soldiers. Again, 
they are our young men, even our boys, bravely shouldering their rifles and 
heading off to do us proud. They are also warriors out to win honor and glory, 
categories that may smack of Homer or the royal court but survive full-blown 
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in the military. They're also grunts, cannon fodder, surly interchangeable 
parts as wont to frag their commanders or smoke marijuana as to fight the 
enemy. 
In part, there are real chronological changes here brought about by social 
change. The rise of increasingly awesome technology, for instance, makes it 
harder to tell a story about a certain kind of bravery in battle: for every 
talented fighter pilot, we think, there must be thousands of soldiers nowhere 
near the front lines, soldiers who wait for someone else to push some button 
or other. And the tum to a volunteer army enables us to think of soldiering as 
just another job. 
But, in fact, all these views are always available, and they're invoked for 
different purposes. Soldiers are our boys when we want to rally 'round the flag 
and brand domestic dissent as a profound act of betrayal, not just something 
lending aid and comfort to the enemy or sapping the unified national will we 
need to grind out victory, but a moral failure to resonate to the heroic sacrifice 
our loved ones are making for us. (Recall how hard it was to rebut the plea, 
"Support our troops in the Gulf!" by urging that the best support would be 
bringing them home at once.) Soldiers are grunts when we want to despise 
war or mock the mindless robots who would go along with such inexcusable 
policies. (Savaging U.S. war in Mexico and support of slavery, Henry David 
Thoreau derisively referred to "the soldier, of whom the best you can say in 
this connection is, that he is a fool made conspicuous by a painted coat."11 ) 
Then again, soldiers are our boys when we want to puncture abstract stories 
about glory and justification by underlining the savage human toll of war. 
Instructively, though, there's not complete symmetry here. I know of no case 
where someone has described American soldiers in demeaning or derisive 
ways in order to assure us that it's okay to be fighting because the price is so 
low. Though some have come close: take John W. De Forest, who knew full 
well the hardship of war. He insisted that "We waste unnecessary sympathy on 
poor people. A man is not necessarily wretched because he is cold & hungry 
& unsheltered; provided those circumstances usually attend him, he gets 
along very well with them; they are annoyances, but not torments .... " 12 
And, of course, soldiers are heroes when one wants to underline what a 
grand and glorious cause this war (or war generally) is. Take Arthur Bird's 
Looking Forward of 1899, a late but all-too-typical specimen of manifest 
destiny prose. In looking forward to the happy days of 1999, those of the 
United States of the Americas that cover both continents, Bird celebrates the 
soldier who gets God's work done: 
II. Henry David Thoreau, "Slavery in Massachusetts," in his Reform Papers, ed. Wendell 
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"The man behind the gun," anxious to lay down his life by the side of the 
powerful breech-loading destroyer he loved so well to train and groom; 
"the man behind the gun" who loved and cared for his mighty weapon as 
a father would his child; watching it by night and day, praying for the 
hour when he might belch from its throat missiles of destruction into the 
enemy's ranks,-"the man behind the gun," God bless him, is America's 
own true born. 
A closing caution: if Americans have so many views of war, so many 
views of soldiers, then it might seem that ruthless opportunism reigns, that 
one can always tell a story designed to come out the way one antecedently 
wants it to. (This is the opposite of the worry that our concepts compel us 
willy-nilly to certain wars.) That's false. Rich as they are in some domains, 
these concepts fail us in others. It's a commonplace among some academics 
that familiar views about bipolar conflict and state sovereignty fail us in 
coming to terms with the emerging international order. We can generalize the 
point: Americans find some (actual and potential) wars wholly baffling. We 
can't always describe the situation the way we already want to. Sometimes we 
can't figure out any way to describe it at all that makes sense to us. The 
poverty of our vocabulary in such cases must be one of the reasons, along with 
changing administrations and the rest, that American policy so often vacillates 
indecisively. So a richer vocabulary, a more intelligent conversation between 
rulers and ruled, would help us sort out what we're up to and why. 
